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COUNTRY: Czechoslovakia/USSR/Yugoslavia

SUBJECT: Control of Czechoslovak Communist Party/Tito u Zhdanov/Marshall Plan

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1. [redacted] in 1943, the Czechoslovak Communist Party was not controlled by the Cominform, which was only a facade, a secretariat, [redacted] of the USSR Politburo, but directly by the Politburo. This direct control was exercised in the form of special USSR couriers who, from time to time, arrived in Prague to give instructions directly to Bedrich Geminder. Klement Gottwald, Zdenek Fierlinger and Rudolf Slansky all hinted [redacted] that [redacted] was close to Malenkov and that these couriers were really specialists on Malenkov's staff.

25X1

2.

3. On one occasion [redacted] sometime between the fall of 1946 and the spring of 1947) [redacted] a telegram from Belgrade, Yugoslavia, [redacted] requested that a special plane be sent to transport two Albanians from Belgrade to Prague. [redacted] Gottwald

25X1

questions which he put to Geminder [redacted] revealed [redacted] that a man on Malenkov's staff was in Prague with important directives and that Albania had been ordered to send delegates to Prague. [redacted] the request for a special plane (which was, of course, sent immediately) was prompted by Tito's refusal to provide transportation for the Albanians.

25X1

25X1

25X1

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25X1

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5.

[REDACTED]

6.

[REDACTED] when Malenkov assumed control of the foreign Communist parties,
[REDACTED] was 1946, [REDACTED]

25X1

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7.

The first time that Zhdanov's name was brought to [REDACTED] attention, [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] was 1947. It happened like this: [REDACTED]

Vavro Hajdu, who headed the German Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was very close to Geminder and Slansky, and particularly Geminder. [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] remarked, "Within one year it will not be necessary to have visas to go to the West; all of Europe will constitute one territory." He did not, however, elaborate further regarding this statement. [REDACTED] Clementis

25X1

[REDACTED] explained that Zhdanov was pushing the Politburo and especially Stalin towards a preventive war. Clementis [REDACTED] expressed the opinion that Stalin was resisting and that Zhdanov was running into difficulties particularly with "Malenkov's proverbial cautiousness."

25X1

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8.

[REDACTED]

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10.

[REDACTED]

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11. Regarding the relationship between Zhdanov and Malenkov [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Malenkov sided with Stalin 100 per cent concerning Stalin's decision to protect the Soviet Empire and not to jeopardize this empire by a premature war. [REDACTED] Malenkov's apparent eclipse was only symptomatic of Stalin's general belief in a policy of divide and conquer. Stalin believed in taking his time to make up his mind before throwing his weight behind one or the other of the disputing internal factions. [REDACTED] Communist circles in Prague were convinced that Stalin ordered Zhdanov's murder. Undoubtedly Tito's rebellion was the last nail in Zhdanov's coffin.

25X1

25X1

25X1

12.

[REDACTED] Tito [REDACTED] is a man of unlimited ambition and it was obvious that even in 1945 Tito was dissatisfied with the high-handed methods of the Soviets. He would take orders from Stalin but would not submit to assuming the same role as the rest of the satellite Communist leaders or taking orders from other members of the Soviet Politburo. [REDACTED] Zhdanov's arrogance drove Tito to break away from Soviet control. [REDACTED] it was in January 1948 that Tito and the Bulgarian leader, Dimitrov, were holding conferences regarding a possible confederation. At this time provocative articles appeared in "Pravda" and other Soviet organs which created a sensation in Prague and which Clementis and other Communist officials [REDACTED] were inspired by Zhdanov. These articles severely reprimanded Tito for his participation in discussions about the proposed confederation.

25X1

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13.

[REDACTED] Clementis, [REDACTED] always admired men who were not puppets and who were of outstanding intelligence, [REDACTED] if the Kremlin had offered Tito, [REDACTED] the governorship of Eastern Europe, he would not have broken with Moscow.

25X1

25X1

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- 3 -

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14. [redacted] Slansky's return from the founding 25X1
[redacted] the Soviet Communist Party did plan to hold a
Party Congress in Prague. 25X1
[redacted] The general feeling in Prague was that the Soviets only meant to frighten
Czechoslovakia by issuing such a statement. 25X1

[redacted] the arch enemy of
Malenkov, namely Zhdanov, was also an arch enemy of Tito. [redacted] Tito
must feel relieved at Stalin's death. [redacted] he feels more secure from
pressure from the West. However, regarding a turn-about on the part of Tito and
future collaboration with the Soviets, [redacted] the prize which 25X1
Tito would demand, namely a position far superior in Eastern Europe to that of
the other satellites, would be too high, and [redacted] Moscow could not 25X1
trust Tito unless specific guarantees were obtained. These guarantees could
only be obtained through Soviet infiltration into the Yugoslav police and army
and this activity would not be tolerated by Tito. Another problem would be
created by the fact that other satellite leaders would greatly resent taking
orders from Tito, and the strain imposed upon the Soviet control of the satellites
would reach a danger point.

16. [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] Molotov is an operator, an excellent servant, but
not a ruler. Molotov also hates the West and would not be adverse to risking a
war. 25X1

17. [redacted] the USSR originally intended to join the Marshall Plan but learned 25X1
only after Molotov's visit to Paris that it would be impossible to sabotage this 25X1
plan from within and thus refused to allow Soviet satellite participation in the
Plan

18. [redacted]

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY 4 -

SECRET
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25X1

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